“Chaos is the great hope of the powerless”, as we are taught by Guillermo del Toro is his magnificent Netflix series Carnival Row; it is also a ground of struggle which is highly sensitive to initial conditions and the malign influence of hegemonic elites and schemes of deception and capture by imperial and colonial dominions.

      In her glorious coup of July 26 2023 led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, Niger liberated herself from colonialist French, American, and Turkish forces of occupation. In April Niger traded American soldiers for Russian ones as protection from various Islamic insurgencies; a giant step backward into a new colonial era under the legendary cruelty of Wagner Group criminals turned mercenaries as deniable assets of Putin’s regime, very much like the British East India Company as a strategy of imperial conquest and dominion of which I have little to say that is not obscene.

    Niger, Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Libya; all are now clients of the Russian Empire, and destabilization operations by Russian Special Forces are ongoing in Chad. Areas of Influence, contested nations, and known operational zones include Madagascar, Mozambique, Comoros, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Angola; I’m sure I’ve missed some, as the situation is fluid and rapidly changing. One could now walk from the Red Sea to the Atlantic entirely in Russian allied or Occupied nations. For the last year, Russia has brought Wagner fully into the state apparatus, and is actually calling their forces on the continent Africa Corps in homage to Rommel.

     Arguably Russia is not a state but an oligarchy of crime syndicates, and her presence in Africa a protection racket; compare the map of regions contested by Islamists with Wagner’s alliances and one begins to wonder how much of the Islamist rebellions are funded and controlled by Russia or their ally Iran as bogeymen with which to win leverage by terror.

     As written by Nels Abbey in The Guardian, in an article entitled Success is contagious – so I’m rooting for the African countries throwing off European rule: The recent coups and subsequent pacts in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are a source of hope in a sea of landlocked hopelessness; “The 140th anniversary of a critical moment in human history will be marked on 15 November 2024. And the odds are that it will conveniently go unnoticed. On an unremarkable Saturday morning in 1884, people in Africa woke up thinking of breakfast, or perhaps their business for the day. But unbeknown to them, a select group of representatives of various European powers had woken up in Berlin, thinking of how and what Africans would think, how they would live and behave, and who they, their land and their resources would be owned by for the next several years.

     This gathering resulted in the carving up of Africa into European properties and would come to be known as the Berlin conference. For the Europeans involved, it marked a huge stride forward. For the Africans it was a catastrophe, one that still plagues and shapes their lives today.

    You can see the economic, political, psychological and security legacies of the conference today in ludicrously counterproductive borders, tragic life expectancies, disastrous economic indices and predatory economic orthodoxies that continue to benefit the colonising states. You can see it in infant mortality rates, children working in mines to enrich international corporations, famines and entirely needless warfare fought with expensive weaponry by destitute people. Or the small boats, stowaways in the rudders of ships, and the bodies of Africans floating ashore in Europe.

     You can see it in the proliferation of bleaching creams – literal poison placed on the skin to make it lighter and whiter. You can hear it in the petrified screams of poor rural African children being caned in classrooms for not speaking or reading with adequate proficiency the “official” European language imposed on them. You can read it in western publications pouring paternalistic scorn on African nations for becoming closer to non-western powers – as though it were inconceivable that they could be the masters of their own destiny or intelligent enough to identify what is in their own interests. You can see it in Britain’s ludicrous endeavour to transform Rwanda – a nation recovering from genocide – into a “deterrent” for threatened, fearful and desperate people who may seek refuge on their shores.

     But despite the bleak backdrop, I see a glimmer of hope. This year appears to have been one in which many African populations accelerated the process of throwing off the shackles placed on them in 1884. Some used democratic means, and some – notably in nations still dominated by France – did not.

     It would be wrong to romanticise coups. Africans especially know the cost: strong men, security issues, strife (political and civil) and structural adjustment programmes. But coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger (three of the poorest nations on Earth) and, for a moment it was hoped, Gabon, were welcomed and celebrated by many in the region.

     The elation in response to these successful coups demonstrates that it would be equally wrong to romanticise the status quo of sham democracies with farcical elections. The cost is exactly the same thing, only with an added respectability: strong men (in suits as opposed to khakis), security issues, strife (political and civil) and structural adjustment programmes (perhaps under a flashy new name).

     Listening to everyday people on the ground, as well as respected African intellectuals such as PLO Lumumba and officials such as Arikana Chihombori-Quao, the former African Union ambassador to the US, these were not viewed as run-of-the-mill coups. Instead, they were welcomed as legitimate and overdue revolutions against French continuity colonial activity and the ineffective, inept puppets it spawned. The coups and subsequent pacts formed between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are – admittedly with a hint of caution – viewed as a source of hope in a sea of landlocked hopelessness.

     Hope also sprang from west Africa not allowing itself to become a new frontier of a proxy or forever war. Despite much encouragement from France, Ecowas – the Economic Community of West African States – did not invade Niger in response to the revolution. Such an action would have ended in guaranteed disaster for the region, which has a population roughly equivalent to the EU.

     Meanwhile, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have formed an economic and military pact, with whispers that they may merge into a single unit. Another very welcome development. Though many predict this joining of hands will end in failure, I sincerely hope it does not. Success is contagious. And this new grouping in the Sahel presents a critical chance to demonstrate the possibilities of pan-Africanism and the clear economic opportunities to the people of the continent.

    Stood alone, the microeconomies of, say, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and most African states will always be prey to even mid-league economies, let alone the US, the EU or China. Pan-Africanism, an idea seen for the past few decades as both a dated pipe dream and a delirious punchline, would finally be given a protracted shot at success, serving as a development dream come true and a poverty-crushing engine for Africa, by Africa.

    It could help reverse the damage set in motion by the original coup plotters back in November 1884. To all lovers of humanity and even despisers of “small boats”, that is something from which to draw hope.”

     As written by Jason Burke in The Guardian, in an article entitled Niger’s coup adds to chaos in the Sahel, but it may also offer some hope: The military takeover in one of west Africa’s more stable states has huge implications for democracy on the continent – and the response of its neighbours is crucial; “An intrepid traveller would now be hard-pressed to traverse the African continent at its widest point, passing from the Red Sea to near the Atlantic, while staying within a country that is not being torn apart by a civil war or recovering from one, has not suffered a military coup since 2021 or is not a failed state occupied by a toxic mix of rapacious politicians, militia and Russian mercenaries.

     The traveller’s undoubtedly inadvisable route would take them from the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray, at war until last year, then across Sudan, where an internal power struggle within a repressive regime has metastasised into general violence, and into the Central African Republic, now seen by many analysts as the best example on the continent of the worst that can befall a nation.

     After this comes a difficult choice. A northern route could go via Chad, ruled by a 39-year-old soldier who seized power in 2021 when his father was killed in battle after three decades in power, and Mali, racked by multiple insurgencies, Islamic extremists and more Russian mercenaries hired by the second military ruler to take power in recent years. Another itinerary could take in Cameroon, convulsed by a lengthy civil war, and Burkina Faso, which suffered two military coups in 2022 alone.

     Either way, our traveller would need – along with some very expensive insurance and much luck – the means to cross the keystone state of Niger, which has become the latest country to fall prey to what now appears to be endemic instability.

     Quite what triggered this recent upheaval in the Sahel remains unclear. Niger has been seen as the most stable state in the region. Only months ago, the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, described it as a “model of democracy”. This conclusion was based on the success of its president, Mohamed Bazoum, a centrist and broadly pro-western moderniser who won more than 55% of the vote in elections in 2021 to become the country’s first leader to take power peacefully since independence from France in 1960.

     Reports suggest that Bazoum was planning to reorganise the presidential guard, an elite force of soldiers commanded by Gen Abdourahmane Tchiani, who believed he was about to be sacked and preemptively took his revenge, placing Bazoum under house arrest.

     What followed was straight from coup d’état central casting. Soldiers appeared on state TV to announce they had removed the president from power and suspended the constitution.

     Tchiani then declared himself the leader of Niger in a televised address and explained that he had been forced to step in to protect the nation from grave security threats.

     The crisis has reached a critical moment. Tchiani’s takeover prompted a threat of military intervention to restore Bazoum to power by 15 western African countries. Led by Nigeria, the group has given Tchiani until nightfall on Sunday to step down.

     The French foreign minister on Saturday called these threats “credible”. Their target, however, has shown no sign of considering any compromise, merely calling on his countrymen to resist any invasion.

     Across the continent there is deep consternation. Kenya’s president, William Ruto, has described the situation as “a serious setback”. This is an understatement. Niger’s stability is critical to the future of the Sahel and the latter’s future is critical to that of the continent. In a decade and a half, the region has gone from poor but relatively stable to a crucible of political chaos, human suffering, criminal trafficking and extremist violence.

     Everywhere there is massive displacement, acute economic distress, intense demographic pressure and environmental degradation. Many of the Sahel’s most significant problems are exacerbated or caused by the climate crisis, and humanitarian officials have described the region as the “canary in a coalmine of our warming planet”.

     The military regimes that have come to power across the Sahel have shown themselves incapable of meeting these challenges. Under Bazoum, levels of jihadist violence were falling in Niger. In neighbouring Mali, now under Col Assimi Goïta’s rule, they have risen by 25% since this time last year.

     Wherever the mercenaries of the Kremlin-linked Wagner group deploy, civilians have paid the price. Inevitably, military regimes rely on force, not consensus, to manage the complex and troubled interplay of communities, ethnicities and sects in the countries they rule. The result is more instability rather than less.

     The problems in the Sahel have a much wider impact too, affecting countries to the south and north such as Libya, Algeria and Egypt, among others. The new rulers of Niger have rejected all military cooperation with France, dealing a massive blow to counterinsurgency efforts there and in neighbouring countries.

     The danger of extremist violence sourced in the Sahel but executed in Europe is real. So is the prospect of massive refugee flows, far greater than those experienced so far. The consequences for much of east and central Africa too could be devastating, setting the entire continent’s development back by decades or derailing it entirely.

     At a geopolitical level, the coup in Niger appears set to add a new recruit to the developing coalition of global south states now ranged alongside Russia against the US and its western allies. Alignment in Africa now follows the fracture lines of the cold war.

     These have been exploited with great cynicism and no little skill by Moscow. At a summit in St Petersburg for African leaders last month, though Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov condemned the coup in Niamey, the capital of Niger, President Vladimir Putin praised the resistance to “neo-colonialist” exloitation.

     Yet our traveller might also have glimpsed a reason for optimism during their largely depressing transcontinental journey. They might, for example, have stopped briefly in Nigeria. Endemic corruption, chaotic governance and a crippled economy make positive projections for the future of this vast country appear almost Panglossian. Even a recent dip in jihadist violence is attributable more to the success of the local Islamic State branch over a rival extremist group than to that of Nigeria’s armed forces.

     But elections six months ago suggested an inflection point might soon be reached. Though 62-year-old Peter Obi, a businessman who offered a radical change of direction, was soundly beaten by Bola Tinubu, a veteran “political godfather”, the poll was nonetheless very different from the six others held since military rule ended in Nigeria in 1999.

     Where the established parties relied on patronage networks, appeals to ethnic or religious solidarity and a massive party machine to mobilise support, Obi and the tiny Labour party reached out across Nigeria’s faultlines, promising efficient governance and innovation, not pork-barrel politics. The candidate’s frugal lifestyle and modest approach put the immense wealth of Tinubu in the spotlight.

     Much of Obi’s support came from young people and urban voters. Many were affluent and educated, but not all, as the voting returns from polling stations in barracks in the capital Abuja demonstrated. Obi gained more than 6m votes – about 25% – and won in the capital, as well as in Lagos, long the fiefdom of Tinubu.

     The new political map of Nigeria shows swaths painted in the bright red of the Labour party. A successful run for the presidency in 2027 is entirely possible, analysts say.

     Such examples will encourage others across the continent. But democracy has been in retreat in many regions. Repressive regimes, parties that have clung to power for 40 years or more and “dinosaur” leaders have seen off a series of challenges from often younger politicians who know how to speak to a new generation of voters and to channel the immense impatience for change.

     This is a disappointment, but if the rapid urbanisation, youth, increasing education and growing connectivity of much of Africa has yet to reach the critical level that would allow reformist opposition movements to win outright, this cannot be the case for ever. The coups in the Sahel may actually reinforce this argument.

     A United Nations report published in July said that, though it might seem paradoxical, popular support for the recent military coups was “symptomatic of a new wave of democratic aspiration that is expanding across the continent”.

     The survey of 8,000 people, 5,000 of whom lived through unconstitutional changes of government in west Africa or the Sahel, pointed to widespread impatience with existing politics as a significant factor in the record number of coups. Though many people said they believed the army should take over when a civilian government is incompetent, a massive majority of those surveyed preferred a democratic form of government.

     In short, coups are welcomed only because there is no other option. Offer a democratic alternative, the logic then runs, and a deep well of longing for “free and fair elections, gender equality and the protection of civil rights” will be mobilised.

     This means that the most important lesson learned by our traveller from their arduous journey may be that recent events in the Sahel, though deeply concerning and deserving of our full attention, do not necessarily signal a new dark age where men in uniform run amok across much of the continent, looting resources and striking deals with nefarious geopolitical actors to reinforce their power.

     The momentum across the continent remains with the young – the average age of those surveyed by the UN was 35 – and the hopeful. Even jaded veterans appear to have decided it is time to draw a line in the sand, perhaps even if it is their political instincts, rather than their principles, that have told them where advantage lies.

     Even before Sunday night’s deadline for military intervention, Tinubu had already made it clear he did not believe that the forced change of government in Niamey could be allowed to stand. “Without democracy, there is no governance, there is no freedom, there is no rule of law,” he said in early July. “We will not allow coup after coup in west Africa.”

     Since the crisis in Niger broke, he has thrown Nigeria’s massive economic and political weight behind the international effort to restore Bazoum to power.

     Last week, Niger’s President Bazoum, imprisoned in his home, made a desperate appeal. “Fighting for our shared values, including democratic pluralism and respect for the rule of law, is the only way to make sustainable progress against poverty and terrorism,” he wrote in the Washington Post.

     Happily for him – and for us – hundreds of millions of ordinary people in Niger, Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso and across the region agree.”

     As I wrote in my post of July 28 2023 What is the Meaning of the Coup in Niger? In Niger and the whole of the sub-Saharan region of Africa, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Nigeria, and the horrific genocide now unfolding in the failed state of Sudan, the situation is so ambiguous and chaotic that a coup by a military junta against a fragile democracy is opaque in meaning and portent to its possible sponsors and beneficiaries.

     Que bono, America or Russia, and how does this change our future in the Third World War now unfolding?

     Here an American trained general and his palace guard have once again demonstrated the internal threat of Praetorian Guards to states, regimes, and hegemonies of power they protect and de facto control. If you want to steal an empire, run its street enforcers.

     Prigozhin and his Wagner Group mercenaries have followed this ancient dictum, though he was wrongfooted by the nameless and unknown force, possibly independent but clearly on the side of ending the invasion of Ukraine, which provoked his brief revolt by attacking Wagner with regular Russian military forces. As a consequence, fracture and division has weakened Putin’s regime and the Russian empire itself, won a time in which to prepare for the Russian invasion of Poland, Lithuania, and Moldova which is now immanent, cleared the board in Ukraine of our most terrible enemy and direct counterpart force, and driven Prigozhin to refuge in his African client states. Here he intends to seize direct personal rule of the nations whose gold mines he guards from Islamic rebels, as did many Roman generals who bid to become Emperor; the question remains whether he can become a rebel emperor or must be a satrap of the Russian Empire. Prigozhin has now become a figure parallel to that of Muhammad Ali, founder of modern Eqypt, an ethnic Albanian Muslim for whom the American boxer named himself, who led the Turkish Ottoman forces which defeated Napoleon’s invasion of Eqypt and became satrap of the Ottoman Empire in Eqypt.

     Putin and Prigozhin may now be played off against each other to win a free space of play for democracy in Africa and to redirect the momentum of the Third World War against itself, to bring peace and liberation to all of its many theatres of war; Russia, America, Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sudan, the Russian client states and conflicts of the sub Saharan and Lake Chad region including now Niger, and stop the Russian invasion and conquest of Eastern Europe before it is launched.   

     This is among many such regime changes in Africa and throughout the world which may be interpreted as seizures by American sponsored proxies, but in the case of Niger has also overthrown a key American ally state in both of the regional wars we are engaged in; against ISIS and other jihadist forces and against the Russian empire.

     These are linked and interdependent, Russia and ISIS, and may be regarded as symbionts; for they enable and reinforce each other though they also clearly fight sharp and destructive battles for control of resources. Russia may even be a direct sponsor of the jihadist terror their forces have defended various African nations from as a strategy of imperial dominion and control, brilliant and so much less costly than conquest; this is especially true of Islamist forces used by Russia’s major ally Iran in her contest for imperial dominion against the Arab-American Alliance in Yemen, Syria, and Africa.

      Niger now joins Sudan, Mali, and Libya as African theatres of World War Three, wherein democracy as championed by France, Turkey, and the Arab-American Alliance and tyranny represented by the imperial dominions of Russia and Iran play for the soul of humankind and the future of the world.

     While the peoples of Africa, caught between them in civil wars which are also Great Powers proxy wars, buy the hegemony of colonial empires with their lives.

     As written by Yusuf Akinpelu in the BBC in an article entitled Niger coup makes the troubled Sahel region yet more fragile; “From Mali in the west to Sudan in the east, a whole swathe of Africa is now run by the military.

     Niger was one of the few democracies left in the Sahel belt which stretches across the continent. But now that the army has seized power, there are concerns over what this means for the troubled region.

     Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum – a key Western ally in the fight against Islamist militants – was defiant after soldiers announced a coup on Wednesday.

     But he has been detained, the army chief has backed military rule, and it isn’t clear who is really in charge.

      Former colonial power France and the US have military bases in the uranium-rich country, and both were quick to condemn the coup.

     There are concerns that Niger’s new leadership could move away from its Western allies and closer to Russia.

     If it does, it would follow the path of two of its neighbours – Burkina Faso and Mali – which have both pivoted towards Moscow since recent military coups of their own.

     They had been under intense pressure from Islamist groups which operated freely across much of both countries.

     But although Niger had been battling its own jihadist insurgency and rural banditry, it had appeared relatively more stable than its neighbours.

     The number of reported deaths from political violence since 2021 was far lower in Niger, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (Acled).

     But the jihadist threat was the major reason why the military seized power, arguing that they need to fight against the insurgencies.

     Col Maj Amadou Abdramane, who spoke on behalf of the junta, cited the “deterioration of the security situation” and poor socio-economic situation as the reasons for the takeover.

     His statement could easily have been made by the coup leaders in either of Niger’s neighbours, despite the very different situation on the ground.

     But despite the coups in both those countries, and the presence of a reported 1,000 heavily armed mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner group in Mali, deaths from jihadist attacks have actually risen since the military takeovers.

     There have also been well-documented cases of human rights abuses, including the killing of hundreds of civilians in Mali by the security forces and foreign fighters.

     President Mohamed Bazoum’s government has also been a partner to European countries trying to stop the flow of migrants across the Mediterranean Sea, agreeing to take back hundreds of migrants from detention centres in Libya.

     He has also cracked down on human traffickers in what had been a key transit point between other countries in West Africa and those further north.

     That may now be called into question.

     And if Western and UN troops are asked to leave Niger – as they have been in Mali and Burkina Faso – it would be a big blow to the fight against Islamic insurgents, who are likely to move quickly to take advantage of any instability in the country.

     Pro-Kremlin commentators have been heard on state-run media and Telegram groups describing the coup as a pathway for Russia’s entry into Niger.

     So we are waiting to hear what the junta leaders say about the country’s future strategic alignment – whether it maintains its ties with the West, or joins its neighbours in embracing a new Russian sphere of influence in Africa.

     This latest seizure of power also raises questions about whether the slow advance of democracy seen across Africa in recent decades is now under threat.

     Even as West Africa’s regional economic bloc Ecowas seeks to broker a peaceful solution, the stability of the region is more fragile than it has been for some time.”

      As written in The Guardian in an article entitled Explainer: Niger a linchpin for stability in Africa’s ‘coup belt’: President Mohamed Bazoum, arrested by soldiers who announced coup, is described as ‘west’s only hope’ in stabilising jihadist-plagued Sahel region; “President Mohamed Bazoum of Niger has been removed from power, according to a group of soldiers who appeared on national television on Wednesday, hours after he was detained in the presidential palace.

     The military takeover marks the seventh coup in west and central Africa since 2020, and could further complicate western efforts to help countries in the Sahel region fight a jihadist insurgency that has spread from Mali over the past decade.

     Land-locked Niger, a former French colony, has become a pivotal ally for western powers seeking help to fight the insurgencies, but they are facing growing acrimony from the new juntas in charge in Mali and Burkina Faso.

     France moved troops to Niger from Mali in 2022 after its relations with interim authorities there soured. It has also withdrawn special forces from Burkina Faso amid similar tensions.

     Niger is also an ally of the EU in the fight against irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa. With the Russian mercenary group Wagner operating across the region, however, the coup raises questions around whether Niger could make a political pivot towards Moscow, which has increasingly courted African governments.

     ‘The west’s only hope in the Sahel region’

     Bazoum’s election in 2021 was the first democratic transition of power in a state that has witnessed four military coups since independence from France in 1960.

     The US says it has spent around $500m since 2012 to help Niger boost its security. Germany announced in April that it would take part in a three-year European military mission aimed at improving Niger’s military.

     “Bazoum has been the west’s only hope in the Sahel region. France, the US and the EU have spent much of their resources in the region to bolster Niger and its security forces,” said Ulf Laessing, head of the Sahel programme for Germany’s Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung thinktank.

    He said a coup would create an opportunity for Russia and other actors to spread their influence in Niger.

     After presidential guards, headed by Gen Omar Tchiani, took over the presidency on Wednesday, regional leaders quickly organised a mediation mission to try to prevent a coup.

     The president of neighbouring Benin, Patrice Talon, flew into Niger on Wednesday afternoon to assess the situation after meeting with the Nigerian president and Ecowas chair, Bola Tinubu.

     “All means will be used, if necessary, to restore constitutional order in Niger, but the ideal would be for everything to be done in peace and harmony,” Talon told reporters in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital.

     The African Union and west African regional bloc Ecowas on Wednesday condemned what they called an attempted coup d’état. The region around Niger has faced instability in recent years, just as it had begun to shed its reputation as a “coup belt”.

     Frustration over state failures to prevent violent attacks on towns and villages have partly spurred two coups in Mali and two in Burkina Faso since 2020. A junta also snatched power in Guinea in 2021.

     There was a thwarted coup attempt in Niger in March 2021, when a military unit tried to seize the presidential palace a few days before the recently elected Bazoum was due to be sworn in.”

     As I wrote in my post of May 27 2022, Theatres of World War Three: West Africa, the Sahel, and Lake Chad Regions; Here I offer insight and policy guidance into what I hope will be the last of the Theatres of World War Three; West Africa, the Sahel, and Lake Chad regions. Mali is the primary conflict now, but a general conflict rages throughout the whole region as Islamic State insurgencies contest with nations under the hammer of famine and drought, and Russia’s mercenaries exploit opportunities to seize dominion in defense of elite wealth and power.

     Sudan is a pivot point and interface between bounded realms of sub-Saharan Africa as discussed here, and Libya with whose fate it is closely aligned. To disambiguate the Sudan and Libyan Civil Wars from the general regional conflict, Libya being a unique war of colonial European interests as a wishbone pulled between Russia and Turkey for dominion of the Mediterranean, where sub-Saharan Africa, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Nigeria, is not a Great Powers proxy war and civil war but a struggle for power between variants of Islamic State Jihadist groups and the nations which control the resources they covet, with Russia leveraging this into regional dominion through the use of Wagner Group mercenaries as deniable assets.

     It is now the presence of the Wagner Group defending elite interests in fighting Islamic State insurgencies and operating the mines for the governments which have become their proxies and front organizations which defines this theatre of war.

     And it is the Wagner Group we must interrogate for insight into Russia’s plans and methods of world conquest and dominion when as in Syria there are willing surrogates to open the door of empire.

     All of this is possible because France has abandoned her former colonies to their fate, because of the brilliant and visionary Islamic State strategy of delegitimation through provocation and implication in war crimes, some real and some false flag operations by elite IS units in French uniforms in coordination with infiltration agents inside actual French entities, and skillful propaganda. In parallel with blackening the reputation of France, ISGS has been successfully building a viable trans-national state in the region.

     This means that the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, an independent operational arm of Islamic State West Africa Province created in 2015 with al-Sahrawi’s oath of allegiance to IS and split from al-Qaeda, and despite continued factional fighting between the two organizations, is now providing central Command, Intelligence, and Communications to jihadist insurgencies generally in its sphere of influence, as an emergent dominion to which Russia is the only balance. I describe this historical movement as the Syrianization of the conflict.

      There are other possibilities for future Africas without foreign empires and their proxy regimes of brutal and kleptocratic tyrants and endless violence for control of resources, and in the long game this requires the free and open sharing of resources among her peoples and states which are guarantors of our universal human rights and secular democracy as a counterforce to fascisms of blood, faith, and soil.

     To win the liberty of the peoples of Africa one must begin with food, water, medical aid, and safety; the first requirements of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. The political follows the humanitarian. Freedom from hunger, disease, violence, and labor exploitation; liberate a people from these, and tyranny will find no point of leverage.

     Beyond this prescription I must give warning here; let us send no armies to enforce virtue, for the most likely result of challenging Russian influence in the region is another Great Powers war of imperial dominion between Russia and France which replicates that of Russia and Turkey in Libya. This will fail, because it plays directly into the hands of ISGS.

     If you fight an insurgency only with conventional forces, you will lose. ISGS has demonstrated a genius for this kind of war, and in large part it is not the kind of war our armies are designed to fight. In this arena, victory on the battlefield is irrelevant, because the victory you must win is within the human soul. And here we win love and loyalty by standing with, not against, our fellow human beings. We must offer the better alternative in meeting the needs of the people, both material and otherwise.

     And in this arena we have clear advantage, for democracy is better than tyranny, equality as diversity and inclusion is better than tribalism, racism, and hierarchies of elite belonging and exclusionary otherness, truth is better than the lies and illusions of propaganda, justice is better than rule by the wealthiest robber baron or the most brutal and amoral bandit king, and a secular state is better than tyrannies of the authorized interpreters and enforcers of divine will, for who so ever stands between each of us and the Infinite serves neither.

     A common enemy of humankind is the weaponization of fear by authority in service to power, especially as identity politics and divisions of faith. Gott Mit Uns; it is our most ancient and terrible battle cry, for it permits anything.

    As Voltaire teaches us in his 1765 essay Questions sur les miracles; “Those who can make you believe absurdities, can make you commit atrocities.”

     As written anonymously in al Jazeera; “Russia’s game plan for Africa, where it has applied its influence as far north as Libya and as far south as Mozambique, is straightforward in some ways, say analysts. It seeks alliances with governments shunned by the West or facing armed uprisings and internal challenges to their rule.

     The African leaders get recognition from the Kremlin and military muscle from Wagner. They pay for it by giving Russia prime access to their oil, gas, gold, diamonds and valuable minerals. Russia also gains positions on a strategically important continent.

     But there is another objective of Russia’s “hybrid war” in Africa, said Joseph Siegle, director of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

     Siegle said Russia is also waging an ideological battle, using Wagner as a “coercive tool” to undermine Western ideas of democracy and turn countries towards Moscow. Putin wants to challenge the international democratic order “because Russia can’t compete very well in that order”, Siegle said.

     “If democracy is held up as the ultimate aspirational governance model, then that is constraining for Russia,” Siegle said.”

     As written by Raphael Parens in Foreign Policy Research Institute; “What is the Wagner Group doing in Mali? Since it rose to prominence after its involvement in the Syrian Civil War alongside the Assad regime, Wagner Group, a Russian-owned Private Military Contractor (PMC), has expanded its footprint into Africa. [1] Wagner has immersed itself in Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan, leading training exercises, fighting anti-government forces, and brutally quelling protests. Wagner Group often overlaps with Russian state foreign policy aims, but its position as an independent contractor lends it unpredictability, while giving Russia plausible deniability. The group offers the Russian state a valuable tool: the ability to test new environments for military cooperation without appearing heavy-handed or overtly involved.

     Wagner has established a pattern of political, military, and economic involvement in Sudan and CAR since 2015. Wagner Group and its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, have followed this strategy successfully in Mali, contributing to France’s recent decision to withdraw its military forces from the country. Although Wagner group still needs to adapt its strategy to succeed in a new environment in Mali, the Kremlin has strong-armed a key competitor out of the country. This creates potential contagion effects for the rest of the Sahel, particularly those countries facing long-term insurgencies, such as Burkina Faso.

      Wagner Group’s Africa Playbook

     Wagner Group has pursued the same playbook Mali that it previously executed in Sudan and CAR, demonstrating a strategic outlook and approach designed specifically for African states. [2] This strategy is based on Wagner’s response to African governments’ requests for security assistance, particularly when African leaders feel that Western states have not done enough to help them via security cooperation, military sales, or through anti-terrorism operations.

     Wagner’s strategy involves a three-tiered approach. First, it conducts disinformation and pro-government information warfare strategies, including fake polls and counter-demonstration techniques. Second, Wagner secures payment for its services through concessions in extractive industries, particularly precious metal mining operations. Wagner uses a variety of organizations and companies to oversee these extraction projects. Third, Wagner becomes involved with the country’s military, launching a relationship directly with Russia’s military, usually through training, advising, personal security, and anti-insurgency operations. Throughout the process, the Russian foreign policy establishment’s involvement is clear, particularly as the beneficiary of military-to-military relationships with a new potential client state.

     Wagner Group deployed fake news and disinformation actions in 2019 Sudan, followed by similar operations in CAR. In Sudan, Wagner attempted to keep President Omar al-Bashir in power, was aimed at protestors against his regime. Protesters were smeared as anti-Islamic, pro-Israel, and pro-LGBT in the news and videos, borrowing tactics from similar operations in Russia. Demonstrating Russian involvement, one leaked memo even included the accidental switch of the word “Sudan” with “Russia.”[3]

     Wagner’s involvement in Africa includes a state military-to-military component, establishing or rebuilding Russian military sales, training programs, and/or agreements with involved states, including CAR, Mali, and Sudan. In Sudan, Russia’s relationship with the Sudanese military has flourished, as 80% of Sudan’s weapons have come from Russia since 2003.[4] Yet, the relationship advanced once Wagner Group became involved. Wagner contractors were officially deployed to guard Sudanese gold mines, but their involvement acted as a kick-starter for Russia’s project to establish naval facilities at Port Sudan. [5] According to expert Samuel Ramani, this operation was intended to help Russia “transit from a transactional relationship with Sudan based on arms sales to a more comprehensive security partnership.”[6] Given the recent coup in Sudan, the port facilities agreement remains tentative, as Sudanese security officials reexamine the deal established with Russia.[7]

     In CAR, between 170 and 670 “civilian advisors” believed to be Wagner contractors arrived between March and July 2018, some along the border with Sudan. These and other Wagner contractors have trained both CAR government forces and pro-government militias.[8] Wagner provides escort protection to senior officials, including President Touadéra.[9] In related shipping operations, open-source investigators have found Ural 4230 transportation vehicles both in Sudan and CAR, corresponding to sales made to Lobaye Invest and Meroe Gold, two organizations tightly linked with Wagner Group. [10] The CAR example becomes more confusing, though, due to Russia’s involvement on both sides of the country’s internal conflict, as Russia arms both the government and the insurgent Selaka alliance. The latter threatens oil deposits owned by Chinese firms, creating tensions between Russia and China and potentially each state’s PMCs.[11] On the whole, though, Wagner’s involvement in CAR is aimed at supporting Russian political-military interests, including a willingness to butt heads with China.

     Wagner Group and Russian PMC activity in Africa generally involve payment through mining concessions, operated by companies such as Lobaye Invest, M Invest/Meroe Gold, and their affiliates. In CAR, Lobaye Invest manages “activities ranging from mining to beauty pageants and the screening of Russian movies.” Three journalists were killed before an attempt to film Wagner contractors at Lobaye Invest-operated gold mines in July 2020.[12] Lobaye gained the gold and diamond mining concessions due to the PMC contract with Touadéra’s government, using PMC contractors as mine guards. Further, Touadéra employs Valery Zakharov as national security advisor, a Russian national with Russian military intelligence ties and Prigozhin financial links.[13] In Sudan, M Invest and Meroe Gold conduct mining operations, which were agreed upon at talks which Putin, Foreign Minister Medvedev, Defense Minister Shoygu, and former President al-Bashir attended.[14] Another Prigozhin company operated as the event’s catering service.[15] PMCs guarding Meroe Gold’s mining operations also attacked local protestors.[16]

     Wagner Appears in Mali

     Mali, a former French colony in the western Sahel, is Wagner’s most recent expansion target. Mali sits on the fault line between North and West Africa, with religious and political divisions fueling a decade-long conflict. Mali’s central government has fought a long-term insurgency by a variety of fundamentalist Islamist insurgent groups, including an Al Qaida branch (AQIM) and Ansar Dine. In 2012, France intervened to support the government against these insurgencies, in Operation Serval and subsequently Operation Barkhane. France also cooperated with other UN member states in conducting United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), under UN Resolution 2391.[17] However, these operations have not succeeded in quelling Mali’s insurgencies. In 2021, Wagner Group became involved in Mali as France began withdrawing its forces from the Sahel. If Russia successfully replaces France as the principle security partner in Mali, this could be the first shift in a West African cascade toward Russia.

     In Mali, Wagner has deployed its African playbook once again. Prigozhin associate Maxim Shugaley conducted another disinformation operation, releasing a public opinion poll “purporting to show 87 percent support among Malians for the government’s outreach to Wagner” by the Foundation for National Values Protection (FZNC). This organization is sanctioned by the US Treasury Department for disinformation activities. The operation, along with an interview by another Prigozhin associate, Alexandre Ivanov, to Malian media, demonstrate Wagner Group’s involvement in a bid to enhance its own reputation in Mali.[18]

     The military-to-miliary relationship between Mali and Russia is nascent but reflects the recent introduction of Wagner to the country. Around September 2020, Mali’s transitional government agreed to accept 1000 Wagner group contractors “to conduct training, close protection, and counterterrorism operations.” In 2019, Mali’s then-government agreed to receive four Russian attack helicopters, MI-171s with weapons and ammunition, which were allegedly delivered as a “donation” on January 9, 2021, as part of a Mali-Russia military cooperation convention.[19] Given the chronological proximity of these two actions, Wagner appears intimately involved in the growing military-to-military relationship between Mali and Russia.

     Overcoming Difficulties in Mali

     Although Wagner Group has pursued a similar strategy to that exercised in Sudan and CAR, Mali has presented a unique challenge to the group. Mining investment exchanges are more difficult to obtain and less profitable in Mali, the Western response to Russian actions in Mali appears stronger, and until 2022, France appeared to maintain deeper ties to Mali than it had with Sudan or CAR.

     Mining and other investment infrastructure, one of the key financing tools for Russian PMCs in Africa, are limited in Mali and are governed by strict control at the government and tribal levels. Western diplomats in Mali have noted that “the mines Wagner emissaries inspected proved insufficient to pay for the group’s services, a reminder of the economic motive behind some Russian power projection as well as its limits.”[20] Mali’s mineral resources are harder to exploit than those in Sudan or CAR. Government regulations are much stricter than in CAR and are not easily outmaneuvered by private companies. Artisanal mines, particularly those in northern Mali, are controlled by armed groups, such as the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad, who have disapproved of Wagner Group’s arrival.[21] In CAR and Sudan, Wagner relied on mining agreements to secure payment for its military operations. In Mali, the company lacked a clear funding stream and faced Western sanctions, too.

     The U.S. State Department condemned Mali’s $10 million monthly fee deal with Wagner Group, followed by France, Germany, and the EU.[22] The EU then enforced sanctions, asset freezes and travel bans, against Wagner Group on December 13, 2021, due to human rights violations in Libya, Syria, Ukraine (Donbas), and CAR. The EU accused Wagner Group of “malign influence, elsewhere, notably in the Sahel region.”[23] The EU also adopted a sanctions regime related to Mali on the same day, leaving out any individual names.[24]

     Until February 2020, most analysts believed that France maintained stronger ties with Mali, similar to its relationship with other West and North African states, than it did with CAR, where Wagner had made inroads. France’s long-term involvement in Mali with Operations Serval, Operation Barkhane, and the Takuba taskforce along with the Malian UN mission, far outweighed its involvement in CAR’s own UN mission, for example. In Mali, France deployed between 3,000 and 5,100 troops, while only 100 to 260 French troops support various missions in CAR. [25] As of January 2022, France had suffered dozens of casualties in Mali, far higher than any other French conflict on the continent.[26] Yet France has now begun a withdrawal of its forces that will change the power dynamic in Mali—and perhaps the rest of the Sahel.

     Wagner’s path forward in Mali is not clear cut, however, given that the group must now face a potential shift of resources to Ukraine. Wagner Group forces allegedly already moved from CAR to Western Russia before the invasion of Ukraine began.[27] Other sources have suggested that Wagner troops from Libya have returned to Russia to participate in the invasion, too. They were allegedly assigned high profile assassination assignments in Ukraine, including Ukrainian President Zelensky.[28] Given the heavy casualties endured by Russian forces, the Kremlin may reassign more Wagner forces to Ukraine. Moreover, the sanctions imposed on Russia significantly impact Russia’s ability to access funds and equipment, which may impact Wagner’s infrastructure, finance, and resupply capabilities in Africa.

     How Wagner Will Adapt for Success in Mali

     Wagner Group and other Russian PMCs have developed an effective model in CAR and Sudan, coupling fake news and disinformation campaigns, military aid, and payment through mining and extractive industries. This approach has increased Russia’s footprint in both countries and can be utilized as the Kremlin sees fit for Russia’s African strategies.

     Wagner can continue to build the military-to-military relationship between Mali and Russia through its most recent deployment in the country. As of January 20, 2022, U.S. AFRICOM Commander General Stephen Townsend stated that Wagner Group has deployed several hundred troops to Mali from Russian aircraft and with Russian support.[29] In 2022, these forces have reportedly engaged with jihadi forces, suffered casualties, and deployed to several cities in central Mali, likely under a continued anti-jihadi mission.[30] If Wagner wishes to build a lasting presence in Mali, it will conduct training and high-profile security missions as it has in CAR and Sudan. To ensure its economic concessions, the group may need a neutrality agreement with Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad and various Tuareg groups. Further, given the continued Western military and international aid presence, Wagner needs to deploy a large amount of troops and make a significant financial investment in Mali to contest its competitors. This raises the potential for escalation or conflict with French, UN, or related organizations, but this is the cost in Mali.

     Wagner can damage Western security interests and public profile in Mali using tactics it developed in CAR. By associating and working alongside with UN missions in military or support operations, Wagner could damage the credibility of these missions, as occurred in CAR. On the other hand, UN Mali and Takuba taskforce leadership may have learned lessons from CAR, and they may enforce stricter anti-Wagner procedures among UN and taskforce personnel.

     Wagner’s biggest challenge in Mali, though, may be funding. Sanctions remain a roadblock for the organization, limiting potential routes for investment. To secure mining concessions, Wagner must come to an agreement with state and non-state interests that control mines in Mali. The former will likely involve extensive litigation and significant payoffs in the judicial system. The latter could include an alliance or neutrality pact in exchange for concessions, as discussed. Failing this, Wagner Group may turn to the Russian state for direct funding. The Kremlin will then need to determine how much it values a military relationship with Mali—and what price it places on the opportunity to challenge French interests in the region.

     Burkina Faso and Beyond

     The Wagner Group successfully strong-armed a large-scale French military mission out of Mali. This victory will have long-term effects on the rest of the Sahel, particularly in states suffering from coups or insurgencies. France now appears uninterested in combatting Islamist and other insurgencies in Africa, while Russia and the Wagner Group are willing to get involved.

     This development has already had ramifications in Burkina Faso, where coup leader Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba twice attempted to persuade President Roch Kabore to employ Wagner Group forces to fight against the country’s insurgency. Shortly thereafter, Damiba led the coup to overthrow Kabore, after his last meeting failed to convince Kabore to employ Wagner.[31] With Damiba in power, it seems plausible that Wagner and the Kremlin may intervene in Burkina Faso as well.

     Wagner may have already begun a media and disinformation campaign in Burkina Faso. A protest held the day after the coup featured widespread pro-Russian comments and Russia flags. Declan Walsh points out that the origin of the Russian flags is unknown, particularly at such short notice after the coup.[32] Wagner’s next steps could include resource exploitation and PMC deployment to support the military relationship with Russia, though no evidence of this has yet occurred. Wagner Group’s appeal in the Sahel can be summed up by a water seller supporting the coup government protests in Burkina Faso: “We support the Russians. Our families are dying, and unemployment is rising, yet France hasn’t helped much. At least we can try something new.”[33]

     As written by Syed Zulfiqar Ali in the Center for Contemporary and Strategic Research; In late December 2021, the Government of Mali denied that it was contracting a private security company (Wagner Group) to help with the security situation in the country. The statement called the reports of such a deployment “baseless allegations.” But even before December 2021, there has been evidence of Wagner Group’s presence in Mali. According to CSIS analysis, commercially available satellite imagery from September (when rumours of a deal between Wagner and Mali first emerged) to December indicates that a large area was first walled off, and subsequently, the start of construction was observed in December. This area is just outside the perimeter of Bamako’s International Airport, in the country’s capital. It is just one of the multiple operations Wagner is running in Africa.

     The Wagner Group is supposedly a Private Military Contractor (PMC) with links to the Russian Government. But many western officials and academics believe that it does not exist, given the lack of any business registered under the Wagner name. Instead, the term has been used to describe an assortment of mercenary groups and companies which use the same logistics networks and have overlapping ownership. The linchpin of this global network is Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian Oligarch with long-established links to Russian President Vladimir Putin. It is widely believed that not having any military background, Mr Yevgeny is a front or a middleman for the organisation, working on behalf of the Russian State.

    The Wagner Group has significant links with the Russian Government. It was deployed in Syria along with the Russian Army and took part in major offensives like the one to take back the ancient city of Palmyra in 2016. The group has also been active in Ukraine, where Ukrainian Intelligence, between 2014-2015, intercepted calls of Dmitry Utkin, a former Lt Col in GRU and believed to be the founder of the Wagner Group with the Russian military leadership in the theatre. Besides, Russian Aerospace Forces or VKS aircraft have been linked to the arrival of Wagner personnel and equipment in Mali and other countries where the group is operating, further strengthening the notion of support from the Kremlin.

     In all the African countries they are deployed to, Wagner carries out a number of tasks, chiefly the training of the local militaries and militias loyal to the government. They also undertake the protection of some of the countries’ heads of government and ministers as well as local and Russian businessmen operating in those countries. And at times, they are deployed with the local forces, which is most common in Mozambique. Securing mineral deposits and overseeing mining operations is also part of their operation in many African nations.

     The Wagner Group is supposedly a Private Military Contractor (PMC) with links to the Russian Government. But many western officials and academics believe that it does not exist, given the lack of any business registered under the Wagner name.

     In Mozambique, the Wagner Group was deployed to the Cabo Delgado Province, facing an insurgency by ISIS affiliate Al-Shabaab. The group was tasked to help the local military in routing the insurgents and providing air support via helicopters. Russia has interests in mineral resources and gas deposits in the country. In August 2019, the President of Mozambique visited Russia, and in meetings with President Putin, he signed agreements pertaining to minerals, energy, defence and security. In September that year, Russian planes started arriving with men, vehicles and helicopters for operations in the troubled province of Cabo Delgado. The Group deployed forces with the local military to undertake counter-insurgency operations but failed to have any large impact. The province has large gas reserves both on land and in the water close to the shores, which the Russians are interested in.

     In the case of the Central African Republic (CAR), the Wagner Group is the primary means of implementing Russia’s military and economic aid. They also help manage access for Russian businessmen to diamond mines and other minerals (primarily gold) extraction sites. It is alleged that Russian advisors and instructors work closely with the CAR military and police and take part in arresting and detaining the local population. The presence of these forces have failed to stop the eight-year conflict, and Russian business has fully taken advantage of this fact, with there being reports that Wagner Group facilitated Russian business mining in rebel-held territories.

     In Libya, the group has carried out multiple operations supporting rebel General Khalifa Haftar, including operating Su-24 and Mig-29 aircraft on behalf of the General’s Libyan National Army and operating air defence systems. Even with the announcement of a ceasefire and presidential elections, Russian mercenaries are still operating in the country, with the head of the Libyan High Council of State, Khalid al-Mishri, saying in December 2021 that there are still over 7,000 Russians active in Libya. According to Mr Khalid, the Russians required a foothold in Northern Africa, and they got that with the deployments in Sirte and al-Jufra.

     Similarly, Wagner’s operations in Sudan started shortly after former president Omar al-Bashir’s visit to Sochi in 2017. The two sides, among other agreements, decided to establish a Russian naval base in the Port of Sudan. Personnel from Wagner were initially deployed to mining exploration sites, the rights for which were acquired by other companies linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin. Slowly this mounted to military support for the regime. Then in January 2019, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that Russian companies were now training the Army of Sudan but expressed that they were only undertaking training and not conducting operations with the Sudanese Army. After the coup in Sudan in 2019, companies quietly kept doing their work, relying on their links with the military for political cover, knowing that the civilian part of the government was aligned with the West. But the change in government has led to a snag in Russia’s plan for the naval base in Port Sudan, as the current leadership stated in June 2019 that they would review the deal with the Russians.

     With the recent entrance into Mali, it would seem Russia, via the Wagner Group, will get rights to mine the large reserves of gold present in Mali, just like they have in CAR. There is another similarity between the group’s operations in Mali and CAR. Like Mali, the group entered CAR right after the French force withdrew from that country. Thus, it is not difficult to conclude that the Kremlin uses the Wagner group as a tool to further their influence in Africa by supporting dictators and oppressive governments, which are in tough spots and at the same time also gaining financial benefits for businesses and businessmen linked to the Russian Government.”

     As written by Federica Saini Fasanotti of The Brookings Institution; “Russia is intensifying its competition with the United States in Africa. In its asymmetric race, Russia uses nominally private, but in fact state-linked actors such as the private security company the Wagner Group and the infamous St. Petersburg “troll farm” the Internet Research Agency (IRA). Both are a major threat to democracy and rule of law in Africa and beyond.

     In its African strategy, the Kremlin is motivated foremost by a desire to thwart U.S. policy objectives, almost irrespective of their substance. Considering Africa “one of Russia’s foreign policy priorities,” Russian President Vladimir Putin also seeks to create African dependencies on Moscow’s military assets and access African resources, targeting countries that have fragile governments but are often rich in important raw materials, such as oil, gold, diamonds, uranium, and manganese. Russian private security companies such as the Wagner Group purport to redress complex local military and terrorism conflicts with which African governments have struggled. They also offer to these governments the ability to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations unconstrained by human rights responsibilities, unlike the United States, allowing African governments to be as brutish in their military efforts as they like. In turn, Russia seeks payment in concessions for natural resources, substantial commercial contracts, or access to strategic locations, such as airbases or ports.

     MOSCOW’S HYBRID-WARFARE STRATEGY IN AFRICA

     Since 2006, Putin has sought to rebuild Russia’s presence and role in Africa, significantly weakened after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Between 2015 and 2019, Moscow signed 19 military collaboration agreements with African governments. The collaboration has focused in large part on Russian weapons sales.

     More importantly, however, the expansion of Russia’s influence in Africa has centered on the use of private security companies to deliver counterinsurgency and counterterrorism training and advising to local governments struggling to counter militancy. The expansion of their presence across the continent is taking place despite the fact that since March 2018, Russia has outlawed mercenaryism under Article 359 of its criminal code. Beyond avoiding official Russian military casualties and thus public outcry against and supervision of deployments abroad, the private security contractors provide plausible deniability for the Kremlin. Moscow disavows any command and control over them to absolve itself of their problematic behavior, such as egregious human rights violations and abuse of civilians. They also provide a proxy tool for military confrontations with the U.S. without directly implicating Russian troops. In 2018, some 300 Wagner Group contractors, for example, clashed with U.S. special operations forces in Deir el-Zour, Syria. Beyond propping up governments aligned with Moscow, the Russian contractors are also a source of intelligence for the Kremlin.

     Russia’s use of mercenary outfits to advance Moscow’s purposes has its roots in the 1990s when Russian private security companies, such as the Moran Security Group and the Slavonic Corps, began providing security services to Russian businessmen in Africa. However, the major turning point for Moscow’s systematic use of Kremlin-linked private security actors was 2014, when the West levied sanctions on Russia for its annexation of Crimea and destabilization of the Donbas. The Wagner Group — founded by a former special operations forces officer in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) — played a prominent role in the Ukraine operations, providing the Kremlin with a preview of its capacities and utility for maneuvers elsewhere in the world. Like the IRA, the Wagner Group is reportedly funded by Kremlin-linked oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin.

     THE WAGNER GROUP IN AFRICA

     In recent years, Wagner Group contractors have been deployed across the Middle East and Africa, including to Syria, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Central African Republic, and Mali, focusing principally on protecting the ruling or emerging governing elites and critical infrastructures.

     In 2017, for example, the Wagner Group deployed some 500 men to put down local uprisings against the government of Sudan’s dictator Omar al-Bashir. As payment, Prigozhin received exclusive rights to gold mining in Sudan, channeled through his M-Invest company. Before his overthrow in April 2019, Bashir offered a naval base on the Red Sea to Moscow.

     In the Central African Republic (CAR), the Wagner Group has been propping up the weak government of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, whose writ extends little beyond the capital, against various rebel groups since 2018. Its arrival in CAR coincided with a Prigozhin-linked company being awarded diamond and gold mining licenses. The Russian security company has been widely accused of perpetrating severe human rights violations and harassing peacekeepers, journalists, aid workers, and minorities. Wagner’s presence puts the CAR government at odds with the United Nations and the Western governments, which increasingly demand that the CAR ends its dealing with the Russian company or risk losing their assistance. In December, the European Union suspended its military training mission in the country.

     Libya’s geostrategic location on the Mediterranean Coast and its oil and other natural resources have also attracted Moscow and Kremlin-linked Russian private security companies. With access to only one port in the Mediterranean, in the Syrian facility of Tartus, Russia’s military presence in the region cannot compete with NATO’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) and the U.S. Navy’s Naples’-based Sixth Fleet. But inserting itself into the ongoing civil war, the Wagner Group deployed units into Libya in 2019 in support of warlord Khalifa Hifter during his attack on the capital Tripoli. The Wagner Group provided advise, assist, and training capacities and, resorting to indiscriminate means such as mining civilian areas, helped Hifter take control of some of Libya’s oil fields. Like other foreign mercenaries and militias groups active in the country, the Wagner Group has disregarded the U.N.-sponsored Berlin Conference’s demand that they depart. Russia has disavowed any responsibility for the Wagner Group’s actions in Libya and their deleterious effects on U.N. peace mediation efforts.

     Since 2017, the al-Shabab insurgency in Mozambique began sweeping through the country’s northern province of Cabo Delgado. Unable to halt al-Shabab’s expansion, the government hired the Wagner Group for counterinsurgency operation in fall 2019, expanding its prior contract of functioning as the praetorian guard of the Mozambican president. However, given its inability to understand the local insurgency and the indigenous military forces with whom it had to collaborate, the Wagner Group’s operations failed spectacularly.

     Among the Wagner Group’s latest worrisome Africa deployments is Mali, where Islamist militants remain potent and governance poor and unaccountable. A complex set of numerous jihadi terrorist groups and regional Tuareg and other self-autonomy movements operates in the country. Among them are dangerous al-Qaida Sahel affiliates such as Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) as well as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS). France has been militarily engaged in Mali since 2013, supported by other European countries and the U.S. as well as African countries under the G5 Sahel Joint Task Force, but has not achieved any resolute defeat of the militants. Now tired of the governance and counterinsurgency quagmire, France is slated to halve its contingent there to 2,500 troops in 2022. A military junta that seized power in August 2020, already weak, is turning to the Russians. With access to uranium, diamond, and gold mines as likely payoffs, a 1,000-contractor-strong Wagner Group deployment was to train the Malian soldiers and protect the country’s government officials. Facing both Western pushback and domestic outcry, the Malian government in late December denied any Wagner Group presence. Such a presence would severely undermine the sustainability and effectiveness of Western counterinsurgency and counterterrorism support operations as well as likely contribute to further deterioration of human rights in Mali.

     DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

     Russia’s low-cost hybrid warfare in Africa and competition with the United States and its allies goes beyond the military domain into disinformation tactics. In Africa, like elsewhere in the world, including the United States during the 2016 presidential election, disinformation propagandists like the IRA seek to ignite social conflict within societies and undermine support for democracy. The IRA sought to manipulate Madagascar’s 2018 presidential election, for example. Meanwhile, in Mali, the IRA accused French counterinsurgency operations of being a façade for exploiting local uranium mines.

     To counter their problematic actions, Washington imposed sanctions against individuals and entities connected to the Wagner Group and IRA; the EU followed. However, as with sanctions on Russian government officials, these sanctions have not led to relevant changes in behavior.

    Despite U.N. and Western criticism of the Wagner Group’s conduct in Africa and threats of Western financial consequences for African governments that hire the Russian security company and allow it to perpetrate human rights and civil liberties violations, the Wagner Group — encouraged by the Kremlin and doing its bidding — is highly likely to stay in Africa. Sanctions are unlikely to change that. But the Wagner Group’s own failures and the counterproductive effects of its actions may in time reduce its allure to African governments.”

Success is contagious – so I’m rooting for the African countries throwing off European rule | Nels Abbey

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/jan/02/african-countries-european-rule-coups-pacts-mali-niger-burkina-faso?CMP=share_btn_url

Niger’s coup adds to chaos in the Sahel, but it may also offer some hope

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/06/nigers-coup-adds-to-chaos-in-the-sahel-but-it-may-also-offer-some-hope?CMP=share_btn_url

US to withdraw from Niger after security pact fails in strategic victory for Russia: Biden administration to rethink counter-terrorism strategy after breakdown of pact allowing US forces on soil to fight jihadists

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/20/us-withdrawal-niger-security-pact-russia

Tuesday briefing: The global fallout from Niger’s coup

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/01/first-edition-niger-coup-explainer?CMP=share_btn_url

Niger is the perfect example of the US state of perma-war | Trevor Tim

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/27/niger-perfect-example-us-permanent-war-posturing?CMP=share_btn_url

Russia uses social media channels to exploit Niger coup

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/27/russia-uses-social-media-channels-to-exploit-niger-coup

Niger: hundreds of junta supporters gather in Niamey amid threat of military intervention – video

https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2023/aug/03/niger-junta-supporters-niamey-video?CMP=share_btn_link

US special forces deaths in Niger lift veil on shadow war against Islamists in Sahel

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/15/sahel-niger-us-special-forces-islamists?CMP=share_btn_url

Niger junta repudiates deal allowing US military bases on its soil

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/17/niger-junta-repudiates-deal-allowing-us-military-bases-on-its-soil?CMP=share_btn_url

Military coup in Niger: archive, 16 April 1974

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/16/niger-military-coup-1974-archive?CMP=share_btn_url

Niger: chaos grips capital after military declares coup – video report

https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2023/jul/27/niger-chaos-grips-capital-niamey-military-declares-coup-video-report?CMP=share_btn_link

Niger coup makes the troubled Sahel region yet more fragile/ BBC

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66322914

Explainer: Niger a linchpin for stability in Africa’s ‘coup belt/ The Guardian

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/27/explainer-niger-a-linchpin-for-stability-in-africas-coup-belt?CMP=share_btn_link

Soldiers Mutiny in U.S.-Allied Niger – The Intercept

Niger Coup Leader Joins Long Line of U.S.-Trained Mutineers

Niger’s cycle of deadly violence raises questions over US counter-terror role/ The Guardian

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/29/niger-cycle-of-deadly-violence-raises-questions-over-us-counter-terror-role?CMP=share_btn_link

              The Wagner Group in Africa

Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, commercial concessions, rights violations, and counterinsurgency failure

Militants, Criminals, and Warlords: The Challenge of Local Governance in an Age of Disorder, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Harold Trinkunas, Shadi Hamid

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/23/russia-putin-wagner-group-mercenaries-africa

Sahel region and sub-Saharan West Africa

https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-islamic-state-greater-sahara#:~:text=The%20Islamic%20State%20in%20the%20Greater%20Sahara%20%28ISGS%29%2C,includes%20portions%20of%20Burkina%20Faso%2C%20Mali%2C%20and%20Niger.

https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/feb/03/while-the-focus-is-on-ukraine-russias-presence-in-the-sahel-is-steadily-growing?CMP=share_btn_link

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/yevgeny-prigozhin-who-is-the-man-leading-russias-push-into-africa?CMP=share_btn_link

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/20/russian-mercenaries-in-ukraine-linked-to-far-right-extremists?CMP=share_btn_link

https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/apr/28/almost-30-million-will-need-aid-in-sahel-this-year-as-crisis-worsens-un-warns?CMP=share_btn_link

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/25/isis-linked-groups-open-up-new-fronts-across-sub-saharan-africa?CMP=share_btn_link

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/07/contagious-coups-what-is-fuelling-military-takeovers-across-west-africa?CMP=share_btn_link

https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jun/12/militant-crackdown-in-sahel-leads-to-hundreds-of-civilian-deaths-report?CMP=share_btn_link

Mali

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/04/russian-mercenaries-wagner-group-linked-to-civilian-massacres-in-mali?CMP=share_btn_link

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/05/russian-mercenaries-and-mali-army-accused-of-killing-300-civilians?CMP=share_btn_link

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/04/russian-mercenaries-wagner-group-mali-analysis?CMP=share_btn_link

Burkina Faso

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/06/burkina-faso-ex-president-blaise-compaore-guilty-thomas-sankara?CMP=share_btn_link

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/13/guardians-of-the-bush-brutal-vigilantes-policing-burkina-faso-islamist-militants-ethnic-conflict?CMP=share_btn_link

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/11/thomas-sankara-trial-burkina-faso?CMP=share_btn_link

Nigeria

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/03/waves-of-bandit-massacres-rupture-rural-life-in-north-west-nigeria?CMP=share_btn_link

Niger

https://www.theguardian.com/film/2020/oct/30/african-apocalypse-review?CMP=share_btn_link

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/06/ferocious-niger-battle-leaves-dozens-of-soldiers-and-militants-dead?CMP=share_btn_link

Chad

https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/aug/14/president-deby-chad-greatest-threat-to-stability?CMP=share_btn_link

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/26/we-wont-negotiate-says-new-chad-regime-as-armed-rebels-regroup?CMP=share_btn_link

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/apr/25/chad-dictators-death-spells-chaos-in-islamist-terrors-new-ground-zero?CMP=share_btn_link

https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/may/17/on-bad-days-we-dont-eat-hunger-grows-for-thousands-displaced-by-conflict-in-chad

       North Africa and the Sahara, a reading list

North Africa: A History from the Mediterranean Shore to the Sahara, Barnaby Rogerson

In Search of Ancient North Africa: A History in Six Lives, by Barnaby Rogerson

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/36341137-in-search-of-ancient-north-africa

The Sahara: A Cultural History, by Eamonn Gearon

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/12254466-the-sahara

Sahel: Art and Empires on the Shores of the Sahara, by Alisa LaGamma

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/50130929-sahel

The Nomad’s Path: Travels in the Sahel, by Alistair Carr

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/18464938-the-nomad-s-path

Horn, Sahel, and Rift: Fault-lines of the African Jihad, by Stig Jarle Hansen

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/51062928-horn-sahel-and-rift